



Contracts of Married Women--Conflict of Laws-Following State De-
cisions.-First Nat. Bank of Chicago, Ill., v. Mi'tchell, 84 Fed. Rep. 9
o .
Defendant, a married woman and resident of Connecticut, at the request of
her husband, a member of a co-partnership doing business at Chicago, signed
a guaranty which was dated at Chicago, and which had previously been signed
by the members of the husband's firm there. The guaranty having been de-
livered to plaintiff at Chicago, defendant afterwards made an assignment in
insolvency, and plaintiff presented his claim against her estate, TheSupreme
Court of Connecticut having decided that the claim should not be allowed, on
the ground that the contract was a Connecticut contract, and invalid under the
law of that State for want of capacity of defendant to make it; held, in an
action against her on the guaranty, that this decision will be followed by the
Federal court. But see Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 375; and Bell v. Pack-
ard, 69 Me. xos, where, however, the court was evidently influenced by the
fact that in both cases the wife could have legally made the contract in the
State of her residence. See also Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed. 742. The capacity
of citizens of a State, so long as they remain within the State, would seem to
be a matter of local law, to be controlled by the laws of the State, and not to
be evaded by the simple device of sending or mailing a letter to some other
State.
Insurance- Tower's Liability-Collision.-Newton Creek Towing Co. v.
£,tna Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 927. A contract of insurance, termed "tower's
liability," indemnified the owner of a tug-boat against any loss or damages
occasioned a vessel in tow fromI "any accident caused by collision." Held, that
in admiralty the term "collision" should be given a broader and more com-
prehensive import than its strict nautical or legal acceptation, and that it was
broad enough to cover an injury done to a vessel by sudden contact with a
block of ice, while, in accordance with an established local custom, it was being
towed through an ice floe.
Street Railways-Regulations as to Passengers-Standing on Plat-
forms-Exfiulsion of Sick Passenger.-Montgomery v. Buffalo Ry. (o., 48
N. Y. Supp. 849. Aregulation of a street car company, forbidding passengers
from standing on the rear platform, held to be reasonable and proper, and that
the conductor of the car was justified thereunder in expelling a passenger who
was suffering from nausea and was riding on the platform that he might relieve
himself. Green and Brown, J. J., (dissenting), held that, while the rule itself
might be reasonable, it should be reasonably enforced; that the paramount
object of such a rule is the protection of the company from liability for injury
to the passenger, and incidentally the convenience of passengers in entering
and leaving the car; that the company's responsibility was relieved against by
plaintiff's actions, and there being no other inconvenience or annoyance oc-
casioned, there was no real necessity for the expulsion, and that it was there-
fore unreasonable.
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Contract-Conditions Precedent.-Stevens et al. v. Ambler, 23 S. W. Rep.
(Fla.) io. Defendant contracted to pay plaintiff $5,000 provided it would ex-
tend its railroad to Section 35. Held, that the fact that the railroad extended
its line to within 500 feet of said section did not constitute a fulfillment of the
condition precedent. Such contracts must be strictly complied with. Martin
v. Railroad, 9 Fla. 370. The meaning of the word "to" is not satisfied unless
the point or object be actually attained. Moran v. Lezotte, 54 Mich. 83, 19 N.
W. Rep. 757.
Contracts-Construction-Provisions- Validity-Personal Liberty.-
Dittrich v. Gobey, 51 Pac. Rep. (Col.) 962. Defendant, formerly the husband
of plaintiff, contracted with the latter to restore their daughter to her upon
her becoming i8 years old, under penalty of $i,ooo as liquidated damages.
The child, upon reaching the age of xS, refused to go with her mother (having
reached the age of majority) and her father refused to compel her. Plaintiff
sued for damages. Held, the child having reached her majority, her personal
liberty could not be restrained and that there was not sufficient ground for the
view that the contract was alternative, allowing the father to either restore the
child or pay $r,ooo.
Receiver-Breach of Contract.- evy v. Tatum, 43S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 940.
A woman, owning land through which a railroad company had built its road
without condemnation, deeded to the company the ground for its right of way
and also for a depot, on conditions that the railway company bind itself and
assigns forever to maintain a depot in that place as long as the railway
remained in operation. Held, that there was a cause of action against the
receiver of said road for discontinuance of said depot, notwithstanding he had
been so ordered by the court.
Divorce-Grounds-Cruelty.-Duberstein v. Duberstein, 49 N. E. Rep.
(Ill.) 36. Held, in an action by a husband for divorce from his wife, that the
use of violent and abusive language or threats, constitutes of itself no suf-
ficient ground for divorce. But see, as to sustaining a decree for separation in
favor of the wife on such grounds, Fitzpatrick v. Fitzfatrick, 47 N. Y. Supp.
737, YALE LAW JOURNAL, VOl. VII, No. 4, P. 189.
Broker-Commission-Defects of Title.-Berg v. San Antonio St. Rly
Co., 43 S. W. Rep. (Tex.) 929. tPlaintiff, a broker, was employed to sell bonds
for defendant, who, he supposed, had a good title. In negotiating the sale he
signed a contract with the purchaser, providing that the title should be satis-
factory. Held, that the fact that the broker signed the above contract was
,not a recognition of a defect in his principal's title which would prevent a
recovery of his commission, where the sale fell through because of such
defect.
EVIDENCE.
Contract-Construction-Parol Evidence-First Nat. Bank of -ailey
&.Beers, 5z Pac. Rep. (Idaho) 777. Mortgagors signed a contract by which they
agreed to turn over the mortgaged property to the mortgagees, on condition
that the latter apply all rents and profits in leasing it to the actual expenses,
taxes, insurance and interest and principal of the mortgage note. The mort-
gagees, at the same time, signed a similar agreement, save that no mention
was made of insurance. The mortgagees failing to insure, and the property
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burning down, it was held. that the two agreements taken together could not
be considered as a single contract by which the mortgagees bound themselves
to insure. Parol evidence is inadmissible to supply an omission in the second
agreement.
.Evidence' of Adverse Possession-Acknowledgment of Title Para-
mount.-Oldig v. Fisk, 73 N. W. Rep. (Neb.) 66z. The adverse holder of land,
before the statute had run, having completed his title, voluntarily offered and
attempted to purchase the paramount title from the owner. Held, that the
attempted purchase was not alone sufficient to divest the possession of its ad-
verse character, altliough the adverse claimant may have intended thereby to
acquire the true title. Such an attempted purchase is not an acknowledgment
of the superiority of the outstanding title, nor an abandonment of one's
former claim. It is proof only that the occupant thinks it -worth while to get
rid of the outstanding title and unite it to the one under which he has been
holding. Jackson v. Newton, i8 Johns. 355; Northrob v. Wrifght, 7 Hill 476,
and other cases cited upholding these views. Ragan, C., (dissenting), held the
general rule to be that any act of recognition or acknowledgment of a superior
title in another, during the period of adverse possession, will amount to an
interruption of continuity of possession, and defeat the operation of the stat-
ute. i Am. and Eng, Enc. Law (2 Ed.), 838. "The offer is a recognition of
the owner's title, and will stop the running of the statute." Lovell v. Frost,
44 Cal. 471. An offer by one to purchase the property'which he is holding
adversely, from the owner, within the statutory time, is a clear recognition of
plaintiff's title, and will interrupt the running of the statute. Litchfield v.
Sewell (Iowa), 66 N. W. 104.
Evidence-Admissibiliy-Memorandum Made by Third Party-Comfie-
Jency of Wife as a Witness.-Pingree v. Johnson, 39 Atl. (Vt.) 202. In an
action for balance of account, where defendant alleged certain payments made
by his wife and under his direction to have been received as full settlement,
his testimony cannot be corroborated by a memorandum made by his wife at
the time. Nor is his wife, under a statute permitting a wife to testify as to
transaction done by her as her husband's agent, competent to testify as to an
act done by her for her husband in his presence or under his direction. Such
.a transaction must be regarded as conducted by himself and not by an agent.
Bates v. Sabin, 64 Vt. 511, 24 AtL io3.
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS.
Quo Warranto-udgment of Ouster.-State ex rel. Boyle, Atty. Gen.
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., of N. Y., 51 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 881. Plaintiff brought
.an action of guo warranto against defendant for exercising in Kansas its cor-
porate franchises, without having been authorized to do so by the laws of the
State. To this the defendant filed an answer and to the answer a reply was
filed. The defendant then asked leave to withdraw its answer, alleging that it
had ceased to transact insurance business in Kansas, and that it brought into
court sufficient money to pay all the costs of the case and asked that the
.action thereupon be dismissed. Held, that judgment in favor of plaintiff, oust-
ing the defendant from the exercise of incorporate powers within the State,
was the proper decree, and not dismissal. Johnston, J., dissenting, held, that
the corporation, having surrendered the privilege formerly exercised, the pur-
pose of the proceeding had been fully accomplished and nothing was left for
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trial, nor anything upon which to base a judgment of ouster. Dismissal was
therefore the proper decree.
TradeLabels-Fraudulent Use-Injunction-Suit by Trade Union.- Tracy
v. Banker, 49 N. E. Rep. (Mass.)3o8. Under St. 1895, c. 462, § 3, entitled, "An
act to protect manufacturers from the use of counterfeit labels and stamps,"
which extends to "any person, association or union;" held, that an unincor-
porated trade union may enjoin the unauthorized use and counterfeiting of a
label it has adopted. This is contrary to the earlier decision of Weener v.
Brayton, 152 Mass. I1, 25 N. E. 46, where technical difficulties in the statute
as it then stood precluded a recovery by plaintiff in a similar action. See
Hetterman et al. v. Powers et al., 43 S. W. Rep. (Ky.), ISo; YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL, vol. VII. No. 5, P. 239, and cases there cited fro and con.
PROCEDURE.
Arguments to Jury-Reading Lawbooks.-Griebel v. Rochester Print-
ing Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 505. To permit counsel, in summing up a case, to read
extracts from textbook and reports of cases to the jury, held, error, if objected
to by opposing counsel and exceptions taken thereto. Reich v. City of New
York, 12 Daly 72; Bell v. Mct~aster, 29 Hun. 272. See z Thomp. Trials, p.
720, tit. 4, c. 20, for a general discussion. The reading of such extracts is not
relevant to a question of fact and may mislead the jury by inducing them
to believe that such a thing is so as a matter of law.
Libel and Slander-Libelous Pleading-Privileged Matter in Pleading
-Relation to Issue.- Union Mhrut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Fed. Rep.
803. In an action by defendant against plaintiff insurance company to recover
upon an insurance policy issued by the company on the life of defendant's
husband, the company made answer denying the death of insured, and alleg-
ing as an affirmative defence that defendant and her attorneys had entered
into an agreement and conspiracy to defraud plaintiff; that defendaitt and her
attorneys had no knowledge of the death of the insured, but had alleged his
death for the sole purpose of carrying out the conspiracy and fraud. Held,
libel and slander. The American rule, contrary to the English, is that matter
alleged in a pleading, in order to be privileged, must be at least so pertinent
to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry during the course
of the trial.
Criminal Law-AfjOeal-Review.-Peofile v. Helmer, 49 N. E. Rep.
(N. Y.) 249. Held, that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is confined to
the review of questions of law only, and no unanimous decision of the appel-
late division in a criminal case, not involving the death penalty, that there is
evidence supporting or tending to sustain a verdict not directed by the court
can be reviewed on appeal (Const., Art. 6, . 9). From this decision, O'Brien, J.,
vigorously dissents. He maintains that the question in the case-whether
there is any evidence to sustain the verdict-has been considered as purely a
question of law, ever since the decision of Lord Mansfield, in Carfienter's Co. v.
Haywood, z Doug. 373. See also i Greenl. Ev., § 49; Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y.
476. The limitations upon appeals to this court in Const., Art. 6, § 9. embrace
three cases only; (I) judgments finally determining actions; (2) final orders in
special proceedings; (3) orders granting new trials upon exceptions, where the
appellant stipulates that judgment absolute may be rendered in case of affirm-
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ance. These limitations, he argues, apply only to civil cases. The majority
of the court were probably misled to construe them as applying to criminal
cases, as well, from the fact that judgments of death are mentioned by way of
exception. But this exception was clearly intended only to enable the court to
continue to entertain appeals in capital cases, just as it had before.
WILLS.
Wills-Bequest for Celebration of Mass.-Harrison v. Brohy et al.,
51 Pac. Rep. (Kan.) 883. In a will a residuary sum was bequeathed in the fol-
lowing language: "I give and bequeath to Rev. James Collins, for mass, for his
grandfather's and grandmother's soul." The validity of the legacy was denied
by the heirs on the ground that the will created a trust which was void for
uncertainty of beneficiaries. Held, it was an absolute gift, imposing upon the
conscience of the donor the duty of performing the service named.
Wills-Constructlon-Eguitable Conversion-Res fudicata-Interna-
itonal Comity.-Afiealof Clark, 39 AUt. Rep. (Conn.) 155. A willdirected that
the residue of the testatrix's estate be divided equally among her husband and
children, "share and share alike, my husband and my children sharing fier
cafbita." The husband was to hold the children's shares in trust until each
'became twenty-five years of age, and then "to pay the whole sum over to"
such child; but if the child should previously marry, one half of its share was
to "be paid" on such marriage, "the other half " on becoming twenty-five
years of age. Held, not to work an equitable conversion of lands of which
testatrix died seised. A general residuary clause will not be given the effect
of a conversion, unless a power of sale is clearly implied from the whole will.
Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y. 588; Hale v. Hale, r25 IlL 399. The courts of Con-
necticut are not required by international comity to adopt the construction of
a will by a court of a foreign State as to whether the will marked a conver-
sion of lands situated within the State, and of which the testatrix died .seised.
It would probably be otherwise if the question were not one directly involving
the mode of passing title to lands in the State. Rockwell v. Bradshaw, 67
Conn. 814, 34 Ad. 758.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Intoxicating Liquors-Sales to Minors.-Bartmnan v. State, 43 S. W.
Rep. (Tex.) 984. Held, that one who delivers to a minor a glass of intoxicating
liquor at the request of another, who pays for the same, is not guilty of the
offense of selling or giving liquor to a minor.
Dedication-Identity of Descrifitions-Home for Care of the Inebriates
v. City and County of San Francisco. 5i Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 95o. The city of
San Francisco dedicated a certain lot owned by it to the public use, as a "Home
of Inebriates." The legislature, later, in 1870, passed an act reading: "The
title to the lot set apart by the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, or a
committee of said board, to and for the corporation known as the ' Home for
the Care of the Inebriates,' is hereby confirmed to said corporation." The lot
was not described in the act, was not set apart, nor was there such a corpora-
tion as the "Home for the Care of the Inebriates." Held, in an action to quiet
title that no title had ever been acquired.
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Damages-Examination of Person of Plaintiff.-Belt Electric Line Co.
v. Allen, 44 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 89. Plaintiff, in an action for damages for per-
manent injuries to his person may be required upon motion of defendant to
submit to a surgical examination of his person by experts, where the examina-
tion may be made without danger to the plaintiff's life or health, and without
the infliction of serious pain. The motion therefore is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court; and the refusal of it in a proper case is ground for
appeal. This decision, which appears to be the first upon the point in Ken-
tucky, is in harmony with that of Shroeder v. Chicago R. I. R. R. Co., 47 Ia.
375, and like cases (95 Mo. 189; 37 Ohio St. 104; 29 Kan. 776; x6 Neb. 578; 6r
Wis. 536; 33 Min. 130; 72 Tex. 95; 90 Ala. 71). But it is contrary to the ruling
in R. R. Co. v. Botsford, ii Sup. Ct iooo, followed by the supreme court of
Indiana, in Penn. Co. Newmeyer, 28 N. E. 86o, which reverses the earlier de-
cisions in that State. Compare also Parker v. Ensloe, 102 Ill. 272; McQuig-
gait v. R. R. Co., 29 N. B. Rep. (N. Y.) 235. The New York code now em-
bodies a provision allowing an examination in certain cases. For a recent
decision in the latter State, granting a wife the right to demand such examina-
tion of her husband in a suit for divorce against him on the ground of im-
potency, although the code does not authorize it, see Cahn v. Cahn, 48 N. Y.
Supp. 173.
Eminent Domain-Mfortgage Foreclosure-Rights of Purchaser-
Philadelfihia, R. & N, E. R. R. Co. v. Bowman, 48 N. Y. Supp. gor. The
plaintiff railroad company, with the consent of the owner, entered upon and
improved property by constructing its tracks thereon. At the time there was
a mortgage on the property, a release of which was not obtained, nor were
there any proceedings instituted to condemn the ri ht of the mortgagee. The
mortgage was subsequently foreclosed, and in an action by the railroad to
condemn the interest of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, it was held that
the latter was entitled to compensation for the improvements placed on the
land by the company. By the decree, and the sale thereunder, not only the
land, but the fixtures and improvements thereon passed to the purchaser, for
the value of which he was entitled to compensation (Briggs v. RailrOad Co.,
56 Kan. 526).
Customs Duties-Classification-Dredges and Scows- The International
et al., etc., 83 Fed. Rep. 840. 'Dredges and scows are vessels, and are not
dutiable as "goods, wares and merchandise" under the tariff laws. The case
is distinguished from U. S. v. Dunbar (14 C. C. A. 639), 67 Fed. 783, where
the dredge was entered by its owner as an imported article, a*l the only ques-
tion presented was as to the correctness of the ruling of the collector that it
was not on that account exempt. See The Conqueror, 166 U. S. f:o, 17 Sup.
Ct. 5io. citedin Y A LAw JOURNAL, Vol. VI., No. 5, P. 289.
Interstate Cominere-Effect of Competition-Dissimilar Circumstances
and Conditions-Behhmer v. Louisville &, N .R2. Co. et aL, 83 Fed Rep.
898. Held, that competition between carriers subject to the Interstate Com-
merce Act does not produce such substantial dissimilarity in the circumstances
and conditions under which transportation is performed as will justify such
carriers in making a greater charge for short than for long hauls without an
order to that effect from the commission, in accordance with the proviso of
section four of the act. Morris, District Judge, dissenting, deems it erroneous
to hold that the carriers could not justify themselves for such discrimination,
?ECENT CASES.
unless they had first applied to the commission. But the only case he cites to
sustain his contention is Interstate Commerce Com. v. Atchison, T. &- S. F.
R. P. Co., So Fed. 295. Since the decision in the present case, however, there
has appeared the case of Brewer et al. v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co. et al., 84
Fed. Rep. 258, which flatly contradicts the present decision, citing as exactly
to the same view, Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Alabama M. R. R. Co., iS
Sup. Ct. 45. In this last case are quoted the words of Judge Cooley in In re
Louisville &- N. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com'n, 1 Interst. Com-
merce Com. R. 47. "if the carrier, without first obtaining an order for relief,
shall depart from the general rule, its doing so will not alone convict it of
illegality, since, if the circumstances and conditions of the two hauls are dis-
similar, the statute is not violated. " * * Beyond question the carrier
must judge for itself," etc.
Patents-Infringement-Sale of Patented Articles Purchased Abroad-
Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 Fed. 192. Dickerson was the assignee of a patent
on phenacetine. Defendant purchased phenacetine in Germany, where it was
not patented, imported and sold it in this country. Held, that such sale in
this country was an infringement, whether he purchased the phenacetine in
Germany from persons other than the owner'of the U. S. patent or his ven-
dees, or whether he purchased it from the owner of the U. S: patent with a
condition marked on the article that it should not be imported into the U. S.
See Vol. 7 YALE LAW JoURNAL, p. 233, for comment on analogous cases.
Contemjht- What Constitutes - Defence-Jurisdiction- Review-Mc-
Clatchy v. Sufierior Court of Sacramento County, si Pac. Rep. (Cal.) 696.
The attention of a judge while sitting on a bench being drawn to a newspaper
article descriptive of the proceedings of the day before, he pronounced them a
gross fabrication. In d succeeding issue of the paper an editorial read as fol-
lows: "The Bee will not keep in its employ a reporter who garbles or mis-
takes, * * and it will not stand silently by while an aggregation of
attorneys tries to make him out a liar and while a prejudicial and vindictive
czar upon the bench aids and abets them in such a purpose." Thereupon the
editor was charged with contempt and found guilty. On trial in lower court
counsel sought to prove the truth of its publications, after evidence of their
falsity in the shape of official court reports had been introduced by the prose-
cution, but was not permitted to do so. On a writ of certiorari it was held,
that the court exceeded its power in refusing to admit such evidence. The
publication of the truth as to legal proceedings is not a contempt of court (In
re Shortbridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. Rep. 227); and the criticisms of the action
of the judge, if made only in proper response to an unjust charge against
accused's veracity, and without intent to improperly influence the proceedings
of the court would not be contemptuous. The action of the court constituted
a denial of due process of law. Beatty, C. J., concurring, based his decision
on the ground that the judge of the lower court, in denouncing the original
report, was acting outside of his judicial capacity. Harrison, J., dissented on
the ground that the action of the lower court, after obtaining jurisdiction to
investigate the charge, was not a subject of review, and that the finding as to
the facts, upon which it based'its opinion, was final. Compare State ex rel.
Atty Gen. v. Court of Eau Claire County et al., YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol.
VII., No. 2, p. 278.
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Taxation-Profierty Subject-Lfe Insurance Policies-State Board of
Tax Com'rs et al. v. Holliday et al, 49 N. E. Rep. (id.) r4. Const., Art. io,
§ i, requires the General Assembly to provide by law for uniform taxation, and
prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all
property, except such as maybe exemptedby law. See. 3 of thetaxlaw of i8gx
(Rev. St. 1894, § 8410) provides that "all property in the State not expressly
exempted shall be subject to taxation." See. 50 includes in the specification
of what shall be embraced in the taxing schedule, "all other goods, chattels
and personal property, not heretofore mentioned." except exempt property. In
providing the form of schedule (Section 53) the words "credits," "demands,"
and "claims" are used. Held, that life insurance policies, while they may be
conceded to be "personal property," or "demands" under the tax laws, are
not subject to taxation, in the absence of a statute providing regulations for
assessing or valuing such policies for taxation. Howard, C. J., in a forcible
dissenting opinion (Monks, J., therein concurring), maintains that it was the
duty of the Legislature to select as subjects of taxation all real and personal
property, saving what the constitution exempts; that life insurance policies
which have so far matured as to have an absolute present money value are not
exempt; that the Legislature has empowered the tax board by clause 9 of Sec.
120 of the tax law (Sec. 8538, Rev. St. 1894) to make such rules and regulations
as they deem proper to effectually carry out the purposes for which it was
constituted, thereby in effect providing a manner of assessing or valuing such
policies for taxation.
